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1 Introduction
In 1997, at the summit of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change held in Kyoto, thirty-nine countries agreed to reduce their
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the five year period 2008-2012. The
agreement prescribed binding targets for each country while allowing inter-
national trade of these quotas.1 Given that the eﬀects of GHG emissions are
independent of the location of these emissions, the possibility of trade has
been welcomed as a key feature of the agreement which will guarantee that
the Kyoto goals are attained at minimum cost.
Implicit in this optimism is the assumption that “market forces”, if free
to act, will induce cost eﬃciency. If the initial allocation of quotas does not
minimize the cost of attaining the global emissions target, countries will gain
from trading part of their quotas. Then the initial allocation of quotas may
have distributional eﬀects, but not eﬃciency eﬀects. The experience with the
1990 U.S. Acid Rain Program reinforces this view. Within this program, SO2
emission permits were initially allocated in proportion to historical emissions
(grandfathering), but permits were tradable. According to most assessments,
1Besides explicit trade of quotas or “Assigned Amount Units”, the treaty contemplates
two other so called flexible instruments, Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Im-
plementation. This project-based instruments allow countries to acquire CERs (Certified
Emissions Reduction) and ERUs (Emissions Reduction Units) as an alternative to AAUs.
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bilateral trade was successful in improving the eﬃciency of the allocation of
emissions.2
There is an important diﬀerence between trade in permits in a closed
economy, e.g., the U.S. SO2 experience, and permit trade in an open, in-
ternational setting, e.g., GHG permit trade. As noted in a recent paper by
Copeland and Taylor (2005), in the latter, trade in permits has terms-of-
trade eﬀects.3 That is, when two countries trade in emissions permits, and
then change their emissions quotas, they also change their supplies of other
commodities to the world market and this can aﬀect international commodity
prices.4
In this paper, we build on this insight and note that these eﬀects con-
2See, for instance, Schmalensee et al., 1998, or Joskow et al. (1998).
3In fact, policies aiming at controlling the two types of emissions are diﬃcult to disen-
tangle, since both originate mainly from fossil combustion. This raises an important issue
about the ancillary benefits of implementing the Kyoto protocol. These benefits, measured
by the associated reduction of SO2 emissions, can be substantial (see van Vuuren et al.
2006). Other co-benefits include health benefits and benefits to ecosystems. Besides being
important, ancillary benefits will be aﬀected by the allocation of GHG emissions permits.
Part of these benefits will be internalized by trading parties, since they are mainly regional.
However, a comprehensive study of the welfare consequences of GHG permit trade would
have to consider these co-benefits, from which we abstract in the present paper.
4One consequence is that some countries may end up worse-oﬀ after trading in permits
despite eﬃciency gains in production. Copeland and Taylor even show cases in which
both parties exchanging quotas could be made worse oﬀ by this trade. Also, based on
the results on the equivalence between trade in goods and trade in factors, they conclude
that, for some economies, free trade in goods will make the rule for allocating initial quotas
irrelevant for eﬃciency.
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stitute an externality that countries impose on each other when they trade
in permits. Moreover, terms-of-trade eﬀects depend on the identity of the
trading countries and aﬀect other countries diﬀerently, depending on their re-
spective position in international commodities markets. Thus, terms-of-trade
externalities associated with trade in emissions permits are asymmetric and
identity dependent.5
There is a literature on auction and mechanism design that examines the
consequences of this type of externality.6 One of the key lessons from this
literature is that under asymmetric, identity-dependent, external eﬀects, the
willingness to pay for a good can be computed only in equilibrium.
This lesson applies directly to the model of Copeland and Taylor if we
abandon their assumption that traders in the market for permits are small
firms. That is what we do in this paper. We analyze a model where govern-
ments, not firms, may engage in permit trade. In our model when parties
trade in permits they take into account how their trade will aﬀect their own
output and the other countries’ outputs, and thus international commodity
prices. This means that the willingness to pay for permits depends on the
identity of the trading partner, and cannot be defined without reference to
that identity. That is, the concept of price of a permit is meaningless.
Certainly, externalities of any kind usually cause ineﬃciencies because of
5Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2007) also consider terms-of-trade externalities as
asymmetric and identity dependent. However, in their paper, these externalities are asso-
ciated with retaliation against a trading partner that is in violation of a WTO commitment.
6See, for instance, Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996), (1999), and (2000), or Jehiel,
Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996).
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to too much or too little production or consumption of a good. However, in
the case of emissions permits the eﬀects on total emissions are not an issue
because this output is fixed by the Kyoto target.7 Yet, as the literature on
auctions with identity-dependent externalities emphasizes, eﬃciency is still
problematic in the case of permit trade. The country that is willing to pay
the most for permits need not be the country where emissions are the most
valuable or the most expensive to reduce, from a global point of view.
Under a cap-and-trade system as the one defined by the Kyoto agree-
ments, permits become a tradable input with some important and special
characteristics. First, permits can be traded with virtually no transaction
costs. In that sense, they resemble -and are frequently considered- financial
assets. Second, they constitute a crucial input for the production of a large
variety of goods. Third, as we mentioned above, the total supply of them
is fixed and does not respond to price signals. There are some inputs that
share the second characteristic, like labor and energy. However, none of them
share the other two. In particular, labor is generally a non tradable com-
modity. Energy, in the form of gas and oil, is tradable and their suppliers
do enjoy market power. However, the demand side of energy markets can be
7Certainly, a country could decide not to sell its quota even if it does not fully use it.
This will not be the case in the model analyzed below, since doing so would only imply
higher production costs. In general, as long as the environmental externalities of GHG
emissions on the rest of the world are suﬃciently large, which is a reasonable assumption,
no country would choose to buy or hold more permits than what they will use. Banking
of permits is a diﬀerent issue that has to do with intertemporal trading and allocation.
These dynamic issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
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appropriately described as competitive. In particular, the externality that
a potential buyer causes on other buyers through terms-of-trade eﬀects is
negligible. Thus, these markets are not subject to the sort of ineﬃciencies
that we will study.
Thus, we analyze a two-sector, two-input, n-country model. Inputs diﬀer
in how clean they are and sectors diﬀer in how intensively they use the two
inputs. Countries diﬀer in their initial endowments of inputs, one of which
emissions rights. We characterize eﬃcient allocations of emissions rights,
and identify conditions on the initial allocation of permits that guarantee
that incentives to trade are aligned with eﬃciency. We show that these
conditions are restrictive. In particular, they require that no country is
completely specialized in producing clean commodities. Therefore, eﬃciency
is too demanding a target for unregulated bilateral trade of emission permits.
Our conclusion is that market design for permit trade is necessary in order
to guarantee eﬃciency of the final allocation of emissions rights. Designing
markets and market rules for permits is a delicate exercise. Much has been
learned from regional or national experiences. Yet, the design of a global
market with global rules requires overcoming political diﬃculties that are
not present with decentralized, bilateral trading. Our paper argues that the
failure to recognize the ineﬃciencies that could arise from simple bilateral
trade could be very costly, particularly if a more stringent and comprehensive
control on emissions is ever implemented.
The assumption that governments are the parties to the trade of permits is
justified for the case of GHG emissions that motivates this paper. Emissions
trading, mentioned in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows countries, the
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Parties, to trade permits for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments.
Governments’ regulations then determine the pattern of permit allocation
to local firms. More importantly, the agreement does not attempt to orga-
nize a firm level, global market for permits similar to the European Union
Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme, for instance.
There remains uncertainty about what will be accomplished, and how,
during the Kyoto first ”commitment period”. Moreover, the UN Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 has just ended without
a legally binding successor of the Kyoto agreement, and much remains to be
discussed about how to reach such goal.8 However, there are a few tentative
conclusions that we can extract from the experience so far. First, with respect
to the relevance of permit trade. Before 2008, diﬀerent papers had attempted
to estimate the volume and eﬀect of trade in permits for the period 2008-
2012. Springer (2003) surveys some of these attempts. The average estimate
is approximately equivalent to 3% of total Annex B countries’ quotas, when
only these countries are assumed to trade.9 The magnitude is comparable
to the transactions value in the world copper market. Those estimates are
perhaps excessive once we take into account the economic contraction that
coincided with the beginning of the first commitment period. More recent
computations (see Tuerk and Urge-Vorsatz, 2009) estimate the demand for
these permits at approximately 2% of total Annex B countries’ quotas (900
8The ”Copenhagen Accord” leaves to the parties the responsibility to set their own
emissions goal, and insists on the use of market mechanisms to attain cost eﬃciency.
9Note that we refer to bilateral trade (from country to country). That is, these figures
do not reflect internal (national or regional) exchange of permits between final users.
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Mt.).10 Bilateral trade in Assigned Amount Units (AAUs, the permits) is
taking place. For example, Japan, Spain or Austria are buying permits from
Poland, Bulgaria or the Czech Republic. These trades are agreed in bilateral
contacts and information about the negotiated prices for the permits is not
public. Thus, it seems that bilateral permit trade is active, and should be
expected to be active in a post-Kyoto scenario, if the instruments do not
diﬀer much from the present ones.
In the next section, we present the model and discuss the externalities
generated by bilateral trade in permits in the presence of terms-of-trade
eﬀects. Then, in Section 3, we show how bilateral trade does not necessarily
improve the allocation of permits. We identify conditions that guarantee the
eﬃciency of bilateral trade. Section 4 interprets these conditions in terms of
patterns of output and commodity trade across countries. The results from
Sections 3 and 4 are proved in the appendix. Some concluding remarks close
the paper.
10Permits surplus is much higher, estimated at aproximately 6.5 billion tons. This
surplus is mainly associated with Eastern European and ex Soviet countries (Russia, above
all). The quotas were estimated based on mid-nineties emissions, and in the case of
these countries those emissions were linked mostly to obsolete plants that are not in place
anymore. However, Russia has announced that it will not sell most of these permits, but
rather bank them for the post-Kyoto future.
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2 The model
Following Copeland and Taylor (2005), we model international trade and the
environment in a Heckscher-Ohlin setup.11 There are n countries in a two-
good, two-factor world. Trade in commodities is assumed to be free among
all countries. We denote output of each of the commodities by X and Y re-
spectively. The two factors are human capital, h, and pollution, z. Thus, we
treat pollution as an input as well as a global externality. Diﬀerent countries
have diﬀerent endowments of human capital, which is inelastically supplied.
These human capital endowments are the only fundamental diﬀerences across
countries.
A quota on pollution is fixed for each country by an international agree-
ment. Denote by zj the quota on pollution fixed for country j. All coun-
tries are constrained by the international agreement. Thus, global emis-
sions, defined by Z =
P
j zj, are fixed and their direct eﬀect on the utility
of consumers is exogenous.12 Without loss of generality, we assume that
h1/z1 > h2/z2 > ... > hn/zn. We will study incentives of each country to
increase their quota by purchasing part or all the quota from other countries.
We assume the same technology for all countries, represented by
Xj = f(hxj , z
x
j )
11We present a sketch of the model. For a full treatment and motivation, see Copeland
and Taylor (2005).
12Copeland and Taylor (2005) assume that some countries may not be constrained, and
study the incentives of these countries to reduce emissions that derive from the trade of
permits.
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and
Yj = g(h
y
j , z
y
j ),
where hTj and zTj are human capital and pollution allocated to industry T =
X,Y located in country j = 1, 2, ..., n.
Both f and g are assumed to be strictly concave, and characterized by
constant returns to scale. They are increasing in both arguments. Assume
that the production of commodity X is more pollution intensive than the
production of commodity Y . From now on, we call X the dirty commodity.
Also assume that Y is the numeraire commodity and denote the international
price of X by p.
With our assumptions, the profit maximizing behavior of price-taking
firms can be summarized by the maximization of national income.13 That is,
firms’ behavior in each country j can be obtained as the solution to
Max{hxj ,hyj ,zxj ,zyj } pXj + Yj
s.t. Xj = f(hxj , z
x
j ), Yj = g(h
y
j , z
y
j ),
zj = zxj + z
y
j , hj = h
x
j + h
y
j .
LetGj(p, hj, zj) be the maximum of the above problem, which then represents
the national income function. Following Copeland and Taylor, we make the
implicit assumption that the targeted level of pollution inside a country is
attained eﬃciently.
13See, for instance, Dixit and Norman (1980), or Wong (1995), pp.40–50 for a recent
text-book discusion.
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The demand side is given by a representative consumer in each country
j with utility function
Uj = U(xj, yj),
where xj and yj are, respectively, consumption of the dirty and clean com-
modities by the representative consumer of country j. We assume that U
is identical for all countries. We also assume that both goods are essen-
tial in consumption. In addition, we assume that U is homothetic, strictly
increasing in its arguments, and strictly quasi-concave.14
With homothetic preferences, the indirect utility function of the repre-
sentative consumer can be expressed in terms of national income and a price
index. Indeed, given that Z is assumed to be constant, the indirect utility
of the representative consumer in country j can be written as Vj = Ij/Φ(p)
where, Ij is national income in j, equal to Gj in equilibrium, and Φ(p) is the
true price index for the private goods. Finally, denote the net imports of X
by country j by mj.
Welfare of a country j is given by the indirect utility of its representative
consumer. Then we can compute the gross change in country j’s welfare
induced by an increase in its quota as
vj ≡ dVj/dzj =
1
Φ(p)2
[Φ(p)(
∂Gj
∂zj
+
∂Gj
∂p
∂p
∂zj
)−Gj
∂Φ(p)
∂p
∂p
∂zj
].
Note that 1Φ(p) is the marginal utility of income. Also,
∂Gj
∂p = Xj (see, for
14Again, the utility may depend on Z. However, given our assumption that global
pollution Z is exogenously fixed by an agreement, we may disregard this environmental
externality.
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instance Wong, 1995, p. 44), so that applying Roy’s identity we have that
1
Φ(p)2
[−Gj
∂Φ(p)
∂p
] = − 1
Φ(p)
xj,
where the left-hand side is the derivative of the indirect utility function with
respect to price, taking income as given, and the right-hand side is the neg-
ative of demand times the marginal utility of income. Thus, we have15
vj = dVj/dzj =
1
Φ(p)
(
∂Gj
∂zj
−mj
∂p
∂zj
). (1)
As equation (1) shows, vj can be decomposed in a direct eﬀect on welfare from
the increase in inputs and an indirect eﬀect from changes on international
terms-of-trade.16
One could be tempted to argue that vj represents the willingness to pay
of country j for a marginal increase in its emissions quota. That would be
certainly the case if all countries were small, and then all price eﬀects ∂p∂zj
were zero. Then, free market forces should lead to trade in permits where the
country that is willing to pay the highest price vj =
∂Gj
∂zj
buys emissions rights
from other countries. However, when countries are not small, the change in
quota of country j has eﬀects on other countries as well. Indeed, if country
j acquires an additional unit of emission permits, this country will change
its output and therefore cause a change in the international terms-of-trade.
15There could also be an eﬀect on international prices of the change in demand associated
with any transfer of income from buyer to seller. However, given our assumptions on utility
functions, this change in total demand in international markets is absent.
16Notice that this expression coincides with (23) in Copeland and Taylor (2005), par-
ticularized to the case where Z is constant and the possible price paid for the permit is
not taken into account.
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Indeed, this increase in country j’s quota will have an eﬀect on country l’s
welfare, l 6= j, given by
−el(j) ≡ dVl/dzj =
1
Φ(p)
(−ml
∂p
∂zj
). (2)
Notice that this indirect eﬀect may be asymmetric across countries since it
depends on the net imports of the dirty commodity by the country involved.
It is also identity-dependent because it may depend on the identity of the
country acquiring the emissions rights. Again, if countries took international
prices as given, then all price eﬀects would disappear: el(j) = 0.
Before we proceed with the analysis of the consequences of trade for
eﬃciency, notice that, if we define ej(j) ≡ 1Φ(p)(−mj
∂p
∂zj
), then
X
l
el(j) =
1
Φ(p)
∂p
∂zj
X
l
ml = 0,
because the sum of the net imports is always zero. Also, the following
straightforward remarks will be useful later on:
Remark 1: If country j is completely specialized in commodity Y (X),
then country l is also specialized in that commodity for all l (>) < j.
Remark 2: If country j’s imports of commodity X are positive (nega-
tive), then country l’s imports are also positive (negative) for all l (>) < j.
3 Bilateral Trade and Eﬃciency
We now turn to analyzing the relationship between eﬃciency and the in-
centives to trade emission permits. If an allocation of permits is globally
12
eﬃcient, then a marginal redistribution of permits between any two coun-
tries must have a net zero eﬀect on global welfare. Note that ej(i) is the
eﬀect of an increase in country i’s permits on country j’s welfare. Thus, the
eﬀect of a marginal increase in the permits of country i on total welfare is
vi −
P
j 6=i ej(i) = ∂Gi∂zi . Thus, a condition for an interior eﬃcient allocation of
quotas is that ∂Gi∂zi is the same for all countries. In fact, given our convexity
assumptions, this is a suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency.
Since preferences are identical and homothetic, and technologies are also
identical and homogeneous, if country j is not specialized in any of the com-
modities, then ∂Gj∂zj =
∂g(1,
zyj
hyj
)
∂z = P
∂f(1,
zxj
hxj
)
∂z . Thus, if no country is completely
specialized and, by the Factor-Price Equalization Theorem, all countries use
the same ratio z
i
hi , for i = x, y, then the allocation of permits is eﬃcient.
Moreover, bilateral trade will not take place, since ∂p∂zj and vj are also the
same for all countries.17
The result that bilateral trade does not destabilize eﬃcient allocations
of permits is reassuring. Nevertheless, the real question is whether bilateral
trade is enough to guarantee that eﬃciency will be attained starting from an
ineﬃcient allocation. Alternatively, if some countries are specialized in the
production of one of the commodities, will countries have incentives to trade
towards more eﬃcient allocations of permits?18
17In this case, Copeland and Taylor argue that any rule for assigning emission permits
is eﬃcient.
18Political economy constraints may limit the amount of permits that each country can
trade. Also, some parties, like the EU, have proposed a limit on the quota that can be
traded. The Kyoto treaty limits the scope of trade. Article 17 states that: ”Any such
13
To illustrate our answers to this question, consider the following example:
Example: There are three countries with Cobb-Douglas preferences
and technologies:
U(xj, yj) = xjyj,
and
Xj =
³
hxj
´ 1
3
³
zxj
´ 2
3 , Yj =
³
hyj
´ 2
3
³
zyj
´ 1
3 .
Let the initial allocation be (z1, h1) = (0.6, 3), (z2, h2) = (1, 2), and (z3, h3) =
(1.5, 1). With these values, country 1 specializes in the clean commodity
Y , and country 3 specializes in the dirty commodity X, whereas country
2 produces both commodities, but exports the dirty commodity.19 We can
compute Φ(p)v and Φ(p)e. The results are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
Φ(p)vi .88 .85 .67
Φ(p)e1(i) − −.24 −.07
Φ(p)e2(i) −.005 − .005
Φ(p)e3(i) −.09 .23 −
trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions” towards reducing emissions. More
recently, in the Bonn conference, an additional limit to permit trade was introduced: the
”commitment period reserve”.
19With these values, p=1.27. Country 1 uses a ratio of z to h of .2 in the production
of Y , and country 3 uses a ratio 3/2 in the production of X, whereas country 2 uses, of
course, a ratio between these two number in the production of each commodity.
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With these values, Φ(p)
h
vi −
P
j 6=i ej(i)
i
is 1.02, .86, and .745 respectively
for i = 1, 2, and 3. Thus, any trade where country 1 sells permits is a trade
away from eﬃciency. The same happens with any trade where country 2
sells to country 3. However, notice that country 1 would be willing to sell
permits to country 2 at any price above v1 + e1(2) = .64/Φ(p), and country
2 would be willing to pay up to v2+e2(1) = .84/Φ(p) to obtain permits from
country 1. Thus, bilateral trade may move the allocation even further away
from eﬃciency.
This is not the only possible trade with mutual advantage in this example.
In fact, country 3 is willing to sell permits to country 1 at a price that country
1 is willing to accept, and this trade is eﬃcient. Also, country 2 is willing to
sell permits to country 3 at a price that country 3 is willing to accept, and
this trade is ineﬃcient. A richer model would be necessary to address the
trades that would take place.20
The example illustrates the consequences of terms-of-trade eﬀects associ-
ated with bilateral trade. The shadow price of emissions is higher in country
1 than in country 2, as shown by the fact that the former is specialized in
the production of the clean commodity. However, when evaluating a poten-
20In the next section we will investigate some general conditions that gurantee that no
ineﬃcient trade will take place in any such richer, reasonable model. Note that in this
particular example the gains from trade are highest in an ineﬃcient trade: when country 2
sells to country 3. In the next section (Propostion 2) we obtain conditions that guarantee
more than this. In terms of this example, we oﬀer conditions such that both country 2
and country 3 could gain more by selling permits to country 1 than by selling them to the
other country.
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tial trade with country 2, country 1 takes into account how this will aﬀect
international trade. Country 1, which is specialized in the clean commodity,
reduces its production of this clean commodity and country 2 increases its
production of the dirty commodity, and reduces its own production of the
clean commodity (as predicted by the Rybczynski theorem). This depresses
the relative price of the dirty commodity, which improves the joint welfare
of countries 1 and 2. This is the source of gains from this trade. What
countries 1 and 2 do not internalize is the eﬀect of this trade on country 3.
Country 3’s exports of the dirty commodity are large, and the transfer of
permits from country 1 to country 2 implies a drastic reduction of the price
of these exports. The terms-of-trade eﬀects of such permits trade on country
3 are represented by the diﬀerence between e3(2) and e3(1), which means a
worsening of 0.32/Φ(p) of the welfare of country 3, if this trade materialized.
This example is not intended as a prediction of what trade will take place.
The main point is that we cannot presume that bilateral trade alone will
ensure that the goals of the Kyoto protocol are attained at minimum cost.
In the absence of externalities associated to terms-of-trade eﬀects, the fact
that two countries are willing to trade means that there are gains from trade
to be realized and these in turn can only come from an increase in welfare,
i.e., from a lower cost of attaining the global emissions target. In the presence
of externalities, it is well understood that this is not necessarily the case. Our
example is only a particular illustration of this general principle.
The question then is whether this example is generic in some sense. Thus
16
we investigate, for the particular case of trade in emission quotas,21 the con-
ditions that guarantee that bilateral trade will occur only when that trade is
eﬃcient, and whether these conditions are stringent.
For a given allocation of permits, let I∗ be the set of all solutions to
i∗ = argmax
i
⎧
⎨
⎩vi −
X
j 6=i
ej(i)
⎫
⎬
⎭ = argmaxi
∂Gi
∂zi
.
Any trade where i∗ ∈ I∗ sells permits to a country j /∈ I∗ is an ineﬃcient
trade. A first step towards answering our question is given by the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 The gains from bilateral trade of permits from some i∗ ∈ I∗
are non-positive if X
l 6=i∗,j
el(i∗) ≥
X
l 6=i∗,j
el(j)
for all j 6= i∗. Also, if this condition is satisfied, there exists a price at which
country j, j /∈ I∗, sells to country i∗ at mutual advantage.
Proof: As in the example, a necessary condition for a trade of quota from
country i∗ to country j is that vj + ej(i∗) > vi∗ + ei∗(j). Indeed, the left-
hand side is the willingness to pay of country j for this bilateral trade, and
the right hand side is the minimum ask price by country i∗. Now, from the
definition of I∗, vi∗ −
P
l 6=i∗ el(i∗) > vj −
P
l 6=j el(j) for all j /∈ I∗. Thus, ifP
l 6=i∗,j el(i∗) ≥
P
l 6=i∗,j el(j), summing these two inequalities we obtain
vi∗ − ej(i∗) > vj − ei∗(j),
21Terms-of-trade externalities impose more structure than the mere existence of exter-
nalities. For instance, with terms-of-trade externalities it is satisfied that
X
l
el(j) = 0.
This will be used below.
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and this proves the first part of the lemma. The proof of the second part
follows the same line of reasoning. QED.
The interpretation of Lemma 1 is intuitive. Countries i∗ and j will trade
without considering the externalities that their trade imposes on third coun-
tries. That is, the private incentive for trade is equal to the social incentive,
i.e., the impact on total welfare, minus the externalities on third parties.
Therefore, when the social incentive and the externalities on third countries
are aligned, the private incentive and the social incentive have the same sign.
Thus, trade would be impossible if all the social gains from trade had already
been exhausted. Moreover, if social gains from trade had not been exhausted,
a trade towards the eﬃcient allocation would also improve the welfare of the
countries. We also put this lemma in terms of international trade. Recalling
that
X
l
el(j) = 0,
Corollary: No ineﬃcient bilateral trade involving the sale of permits by
i∗ ∈ I∗ can have a mutual advantage if, for all j 6= i∗,
(mi∗ +mj)
Ã
∂p
∂zi∗
− ∂p
∂zj
!
≤ 0.
Also, if this condition is satisfied, there exists a price at which country j,
j /∈ I∗, sells to country i∗ at mutual advantage.
4 Trade, Specialization, and the Eﬃciency of
Trade
Lemma 1 and its corollary show conditions that guarantee some sort of sta-
bility of the eﬃcient solution. These conditions are set in terms of net trades
18
and the impact of permits on international prices. The latter may be diﬃcult
to observe. In this section we relate the conditions in the previous section
with the structure of output of the diﬀerent countries.
From now on, let us denote by bi the country with lowest rate z/h. That
is, bi denotes the country most intensive in h among the countries that are not
specialized.22 Thus, all countries j < bi will produce only the clean commodity
Y . Moreover, all countries specialized in Y will import commodityX, so that
mj > 0 for these countries.
Under constant returns to scale, the productivity of an input in the pro-
duction of one commodity depends inversely on the ratio of that input to
the other input used in that production. When a country is completely spe-
cialized in one commodity, this ratio is simply the ratio of the endowments.
With little more than this observation, we can show that
Lemma 2: 1 ∈ I∗. If bi 6= 1, then I∗ = {1}. If bi = 1, then I∗coincides
with the set of countries that are not specialized in production.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 is intuitive. If two countries are producing the same good, it is
eﬃcient to assign additional permits to the country that is producing with the
greatest ratio of h to z. For the case of commodityX one of these countries isbi. But for country bi the slope of the production possibilities frontier is equal
to the price. Then, it follows almost immediately that countries which face
scarcity of the input z relative to the market transformation rate should be
the ones that are assigned any extra amount of such input. Thus, eﬃciency
22There may be extreme cases where all countries are specialized. This is a simple case
that follows the same line of analysis.
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requires that this input is assigned to country 1 if this country is completely
specialized in Y , or else to some country that produces both commodities.
The signs of price eﬀects and their relative sizes are also well behaved for
similar reasons, :
Lemma 3: ∂p∂zj >
∂p
∂zj0
> 0 for all j < j0 < bi. Also, if country j > bi is
completely specialized in commodity X, then ∂p∂zbi < ∂p∂zj0 < 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Notice that the eﬀect on the price of X of an increase in emissions per-
mits of country bi is negative, which follows from Rybczynsky’s theorem. A
simple corollary of this theorem is that this eﬀect is the same for all countries
that produce both goods. In fact, the largest, negative eﬀect on the price
is obtained by assigning new emission permits to any of these countries.
Lemma 3 is partly a consequence of the fact that, under our assumptions
on preferences and technologies, consumers in each country spend the same
proportion of their income in each of the commodities. Then, each country
j < bi spends the same proportion of their income in imports of the dirty
commodity, and each country j that is completely specialized in X exports
the same proportion of their output.
We can now relate the conditions of Lemma 1 to the pattern of outputs
and trades.
Proposition 1: For i∗ ∈ I∗, (mi∗ +mj)
³
∂p
∂zi∗
− ∂p∂zj
´
≤ 0 for all j 6= i∗ if
and only if bi = 1, that is, if and only if country 1 produces both commodities.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The next proposition analyzes conditions such that the gains from trade
are not only positive when trade is eﬃcient, but are also maximized by such
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trade.
Proposition 2: Assume that for i∗ ∈ I∗, (mi∗ +mj)
³
∂p
∂zi∗
− ∂p∂zj
´
≤ 0 for
all j 6= i∗ (and then bi = 1). For any j /∈ I∗ the gain from trading emission
permits with i∗ is positive and larger than the gain from trading with any
other country not in I∗.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 establishes necessary conditions for Lemma 1 to apply, so
that eﬃcient trades of permits are feasible and no trade involving the sale
of permits by their most eﬃcient user is feasible. Yet, as in our example,
other permit trades between countries not in I∗ may be feasible even under
the conditions of Proposition 1. We do not know whether those trades would
be eﬃcient or not. Would a country sell permits to another country not in
I∗, instead of selling to a country in I∗? Again, we would need a model of
how countries find trade partners, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, Proposition 2 suggests that such models would predict the right
trades under the conditions of Lemma 1.
Summarizing our results, we can be certain that bilateral trade would lead
initial allocations toward more eﬃcient ones only when the country with the
highest relative endowment of h is not too intensive in h and/or is suﬃciently
large so as to not specialize in any commodity.
When these conditions are not satisfied, permit trade need not guarantee
that the goals of the Kyoto protocol will be attained at minimum cost. A
laissez-faire approach which simply sets a cap on total GHG emissions ex-
pecting the ”market” to find the right distribution of emissions, may be too
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optimistic. The initial allocation of permits and the trade mechanism may
have an eﬀect on the size of the cost of the program, and not only on how
this cost is shared across countries.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that free market forces, understood as the unregulated,
decentralized bilateral trade between countries, are not suﬃcient to guarantee
an eﬃcient allocation of GHG emission quotas. The corollary is that market
design should be a key ingredient to attain this eﬃciency goal.
The main feature of permit trade that accounts for this result is the pres-
ence of identity-dependent, asymmetric, external eﬀects. Diﬀerent countries
may have diﬀerent preferences about which country obtains additional per-
mits, if they themselves do not.
There are three assumptions that are essential for our results. The first
one is openness of the international commodities market. The second is that
traders, in this case countries, are not small in the permit market. Indeed,
if they were small, a country could not influence the allocation of permits.
The third is that countries are not small in the commodities market either.
If they were, international prices in these markets would not be aﬀected by
changes in production of an individual country, and therefore externalities
through terms-of-trade would not be an issue.
In the above analysis we have assumed that countries buy permits only to
use them, and do not trade for purely speculative reasons.23 Also, the results
23If countries can buy permits for purely speculative motives, then bilateral trade results
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were obtained under several simplifying assumptions on the technology and
preferences. However, we think that our arguments are suﬃciently robust to
support the claim that bilateral trade may not be a good substitute for the
design of a market for permits.
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7 Appendix
Proof of lemma 2: All countries i = 1, ...,bi− 1 specialize in commodity Y .
That is, Gj(p, hj, zj) = g(hj, zj). Thus,
∂Gj
∂zj
=
∂g(1, zjhj )
∂z
,∀j < bi,
Since g exhibits decreasing returns in each of its inputs, and hjzj >
hj0
zj0
for
j < j0, this excludes 2, ...,bi− 1 ∈ I∗. Similarly, we show that hjzj ≤ hxbizxbi for all
j that specialize in commodity X. That is, country bi produces commodity
X using h more intensively than country j. Indeed, since bi produces both
commodities,
P ·
∂f(
hxbi
zxbi , 1)
∂h
=
∂g(
hybi
zybi , 1)
∂h
.
Thus, if hjzj >
hxbi
zxbi , then
P ·
∂f(hjzj , 1)
∂h
<
∂g(
hxbi
zxbi , 1)
∂h
,
so that country j would increase its national income by switching an infini-
tesimal amount of inputs from the production of X to the production of Y
in the proportion
hybi
zybi .
Now, applying the envelope theorem,
∂Gbi
∂zbi = P · ∂f(h
xbi ,zxbi )
∂z > P · ∂f(hj ,zj)∂z =
∂Gj
∂zj
. This excludes i∗ > bi and specialized in production of X. We need
only excluding 1 < bi ∈ I∗. Notice that bi ∈ I∗ implies that hybizybi >
hbi−1
zbi−1 ,
since ∂Gj∂zj =
∂g(1,
zyj
hyj
)
∂zj
for j ≤ bi, and ∂2g∂z2 < 0. On the other hand, since
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hbi−1
zbi−1 > hbizbi it is immediate that h
xbi
zxbi <
hbi−1
zbi−1 (< h
ybi
zybi ). Also, notice that countrybi−1 could always switch a small amount of inputs z and h in the proportion
hxbi
zxbi , without reducing the ratio
hybi
zybi . Then, since P ·
∂f(
hxbi
zxbi ,1)
∂z =
∂g(
hybi
zybi ,1)
∂z >
∂g(
hbi−1
zbi−1 ,1)
∂z , country
bi−1’s income would increase, which contradicts one of the
equilibrium conditions. Lemma 2 follows.
The last part of the Lemma follows from the result just proved that
∂Gbi
∂zbi > ∂Gj∂zj , for j > bi if j is specialized in production of X, together with the
fact that, from the factor price equalization theorem, ∂Gi∂zi =
∂Gh
∂zh
for all j, h
that are not completely specialized in production. QED.
Proof of Lemma 3: Consider the market clearing condition
nX
l=1
ml = 0.
Totally diﬀerentiating in this equilibrium condition, we obtain
∂p
∂zj
= −∂
Pn
l=1ml/∂zj
∂
Pn
l=1ml/∂p
.
Now, since U is homothetic, increasing and quasi-concave in all its arguments,
the domestic demand of commodity X is
xj(P,Gj) = α(P )
Gj
P
,
where α(P ) ∈ (0, 1). Also, country j0s output of commodity X is f(hj, zj) =
Gi
P if j is specialized in commodity X, and 0 if j <
bi. Thus,
mj = xj−Xj =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
α(P )GiP = α(P )
g(hj ,zj)
P if j <
bi
α(P )GiP −
Gi
P = f(hj, zj) (α(P )− 1) if j specialized in X
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Notice that
∂
Pn
l=1ml
∂p < 0. Also,
∂
Pn
l=1ml
∂zj
= ∂mj∂zj . Homogeneity of degree 1
of both g and f , and decreasing returns in each of the inputs again allow
us to conclude that ∂p∂zj >
∂p
∂zj0
> 0 for all j < j0 < bi and ∂p∂zj < ∂p∂zj0 < 0
for all countries j < j0 completely specialized in commodity X. Thus, the
only thing that is left to analyze is
∂mbi
∂zbi . For that purpose, we first show
that hjzj ≤
hxbi
zxbi when j is completely specialized in commodity X. That is,
country bi produces commodity X using h more intensively than country j.
Indeed, since bi produces both commodities, and since partial derivatives of
the production function are homogeneous of degree 0, then
P ·
∂f(
hxbi
zxbi , 1)
∂h
=
∂g(
hybi
zybi , 1)
∂h
.
Thus, if hjzj >
hxbi
zxbi , then
P ·
∂f(hjzj , 1)
∂h
<
∂g(
hybi
zybi , 1)
∂h
,
so that country j would increase its national income by switching an infini-
tesimal amount of inputs from the production of X to the production of Y
in the proportion
hybi
zybi .
But , applying the envelope theorem,
∂Gbi
∂zbi = P · ∂f(h
xbi ,zxbi )
∂z > P · ∂f(hj ,zj)∂z =
∂Gj
∂zj
. Thus, mj = f(hj, zj) (α(P )− 1), and mbi = GjP α(P ) − f(hxbi , zxbi ) =
f(hxbi , zxbi ) (α(P )− 1) + α(P )P g(hybi , zybi ). Also, ∂g(h
ybi (z),zybi (z))
∂z < 0, from Rybczyn-
ski’s Theorem, where hybi (z) and zybi (z) are quantities of inputs used in the
production of y, as function of the total endowment of z of country bi. Thus,
∂f(hxbi (z),zxbi (z))
∂z >
∂f(hxbi ,zxbi )
∂z , since country
bi would not be maximizing national
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income otherwise, and since α(P )− 1 < 0, then ∂mbi∂zbi < ∂f(h
xbi ,zxbi )
∂z (α(P )− 1) <
∂mj
∂zj
< 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 1: First we prove the only if part. Assume thatbi > 1. If bi > 2, then m1 +m2 > 0 and ∂p∂z1 − ∂p∂z2 > 0 as well. Thus, we need
consider only bi = 2. If m2 > 0, again m1 + m2 > 0 and ∂p∂z1 − ∂p∂z2 > 0. If
m2 < 0, then for all j > 2, we have that mj < 0 as well, from our remark 2.
Thus, only country 1 imports. Thus, we still havem1+m2 > 0, ∂p∂zi∗−
∂p
∂z2
> 0.
Now we turn to the if part. Notice that if i∗ = 1 is the only country that
is not specialized in the production of a single commodity, then country 1
is the only country that produces commodity Y and the only country that
imports X, so that mi∗ + mj > 0 for all j. Also, ∂p∂zi∗ <
∂p
∂zj
< 0 for all j.
Thus, (mi∗ +mj)
³
∂p
∂zi∗
− ∂p∂zj
´
≤ 0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2: We need to show that, under the assumptions
of Lemma 1, v i∗ + e i∗(j) − [vj + ej( i∗)] > vl + el(j) − [ vj + ej(l)] for
all j, l /∈ I∗. Notice that, if the assumption of Lemma 1 is satisfied, then
v i∗ + e i∗(j) > vl + el(j). Thus, we need only showing that ej(l) > ej( i∗).
That is, mj( ∂p∂zl −
∂p
∂z i∗
) > 0. This follows from the assumption that bi = 1,
which implies that all j /∈ I∗is specialized in the production of the dirty
commodity so that mj < 0. QED.
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